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This  paper  discusses  the  transport  of  containers  between  the  Port  of  Prince 
















for  this  terminal  to ultimately have a  capacity of at  least  two million TEUs, approximately  the 
2007 volumes of the Ports of Vancouver, Seattle, and Tacoma.  There also exist plans to increase 
this to four million TEUs.   At this capacity Prince Rupert would be the largest container port  in 
Canada  (by  container  volume).    In  this paper we consider  some of  the  issues  surrounding  the 
transport of  these  containers between  the port  and  the hinterland.    These  include evaluating 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American West Coast marine  terminals  serving at  least one million TEUs annually  are  in  large 
urban centers such as Vancouver, Seattle, Tacoma, Oakland, Los Angeles, and Long Beach.  This 
presents  a  new model  of  the North American marine  terminal.    Prince  Rupert  does  not  have 
significant  local  services  nor  is  there  a  significant  local  demand  for  goods.   Unlike  other west 
coast  ports  Prince  Rupert  will  not  have  resources  for  rehandling  goods  or  transloading 
containers  nor  well  developed  and  resilient  communication,  energy,  and  transportation 






weather  (Hurricane  Katrina;  2007  Skeena  river  flood),  natural  disasters  (Loma  Prieta 
Earthquake),  terrorist  events  (destruction  of  the  World  Trade  Center),  failing  infrastructure 
(collapse  of  the  I‐95  bridge  in  Minnesota),  and  security  vulnerabilities  (police  chase  closes 
Canadian/US border, 2006).  At the same time, companies have been streamlining their supply 
chains  by  consolidating  flow  into  a  small  number  of  channels,  and  reducing  inventory  cost.  
Although  these  supply  chains  can  operate  under  normal  conditions  at  lower  cost,  there  are 
greater  economic  costs  to  disruption.    A  literature  has  developed  to  consider  the  “resilient 
enterprise”2,  one  that  can  operate  efficiently,  but  is  also  tolerant  to  disruption.    As  a  result, 
more recently,  large importers such as WalMart, who had previously used a one port strategy; 
importing all of their United States destined Asian goods through the Ports of Los Angeles and 
Long  Beach,  have moved  to  a  distributed  strategy,  using  five  geographically  distributed  ports 
around  the United  States  for  their  Asian  imports  (Los  Angeles,  Tacoma, New  York,  Savannah, 
and Houston).  An example of this can be seen by considering the volumes of containers handled 
at West Coast ports in recent years (see figure 1 below).  In 2004 the Ports of Los Angeles and 
Long  Beach  suffered  from  heavy  congestion  due  in  large  part  to  a  lack  of  available 
longshoremen, and vessels were delayed by up to a week.3  In 2005, the Port of Seattle had the 
largest  percentage  growth  of  all  US  ports,  in  part  because  many  carriers  decided  to  divert 
volume north in search of more reliable travel times. 
An  efficient  supply  chain  has  become  a  requirement  for  success  in  the  retail  market.4  

















Consistent with the Port of Prince Rupert’s expectations,  it  is assumed all containers will  leave 
the port on  trains.   The Port aims  to  reach an annual capacity of  two million TEUs.   The  track 
between  Prince  George  and  Prince  Rupert  is  a  single  track  with  one  kilometer  sidings 
approximately  every  30  kilometers,  the  track  is  approximately  600  kilometers  in  length  with 
centralized  traffic control.   During 2007 the  tunnels between Smithers and Terrace, BC will be 






destination terminals operate  for 16 hours a day,  then the capacity of  the track  is 16 trains  in 
each direction. 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each direction each day.   This would be extremely difficult  to manage at  the  terminals with a 













16  Two  directions  simultaneously  but 
terminals operate just 16 hours per day 
16 trains per day each direction 
24  Segregate  traffic  with  5  minute 
headways. 
48  trains  per  day  in  each 
direction 
24   Segregate  traffic  with  10  minute 
headways. 








goods  will  be  bound  for  Prince  Rupert,  rather,  these  goods  may  be  transported  to  a 
consolidation  center  where  containers  are  unpacked,  packed  with  the  goods  destined  for  a 
single location (and perhaps from several factories) and shipped out.  A double stacked train can 
hold approximately 350 TEUs (assuming each rail car carries two 40 foot containers or 4 TEUs).  










In addition  to  intermodal  trains carrying containers,  the Port of Prince Rupert plans  to service 
coal  trains  from  Eastern  British  Columbia  and  grain  trains  from  the  prairies  to  Prince  Rupert.  
Ridley terminal in Prince Rupert handles both the coal and grain exports.   Currently the Port can 























and  landslides.   To understand the  impact of  these  failures on service  reliability,  the historical 
record  of  rainstorm  and  flood  damage  in  the  area6  provided  details  of  all  rainstorms  and 
consequent  damages.    From  this  we  extracted  events  that  caused  rail  line  damage  or 




impact of weather disruptions  to  containers  traveling  in and out of  the Port of Prince Rupert.  
For  example,  on  03  March,  1911  there  was  service  interruption  at  Swanson  Bay  due  to  a 
landslide.  All service on the line was ceased for three days.  In the example above, it is assumed 
the Port would  like  to be moving  four  trains per day, but cannot move any  for  three days.    It 









































4  24  95222  2285335  2.29 
 1,000,000   5 day a week 
operation 
6  24  158704  3808892  3.81 
 2,000,000   7  8  24  238056  5713339  2.86 
 2,000,000   5  11  24  402864  9668727  4.83 
 4,000,000   7  16  24  952223  22853355  5.71 
 4,000,000   5  22  24  5237227  125693450  31.42 














Most  disruptions  occurred  in  the  winter  months,  October  through  January,  while  summer 






Port  activity.    The  average  disruption  duration  is  almost  1  day  in October  (no  service  in  each 
direction), whereas  it  is 0  in June.   The expected total delay  is shown for each month  in train‐
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Jan 0.46 13.2 21.9 32.9 55.7 131.6 723.7 
Feb 0.16 2.5 5.3 8.0 13.5 31.9 175.2 
Mar 0.20 10.2 7.0 10.5 17.8 42.0 231.2 
Apr 0.04 0.1 0.7 1.0 1.7 4.0 22.1 
May 0.49 57.5 90.3 135.5 229.3 541.9 2980.6 
Jun 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Jul 0.02 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 2.2 
Aug 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sep 0.05 0.1 1.0 1.5 2.5 6.0 32.9 
Oct 0.95 1.6 158.4 237.7 402.2 950.6 5228.5 
Nov 0.73 67.7 61.4 92.2 156.0 368.7 2027.7 
Dec 0.35 14.2 21.1 31.7 53.6 126.6 696.4 
Figure 6 shows the total service interruption duration and delay by year. The duration and delay 




Line  closures  in  and  out  of  Prince  Rupert  are  not  uncommon,  and  would  cause  significant 
disruption to the transportation system.  A recent study suggests the cost of the Los Angeles and 
Long  Beach  port  complex  closure  at  $1  billion  per  day.7   While  this  port  complex  handles  an 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pass‐through  facility  for  goods  traveling  through  the  location  but  destined  for  outside  the 
region, and a terminal for goods destined for the region itself.  Historically ports were designed 
as terminals, and are still referred to as marine terminals, serving the area around them.  With 
the development of  low cost overland  transportation,  the West Coast ports have become  the 




all  of  the  consolidation/deconsolidation.8    Importers  use  regional  handling  facilities  to  take 





carry  out  necessary  re‐stuffing  to  convert  from  factory based packing  to  store based packing.  




any  destination,  all  containers  leaving  Prince  Rupert must  travel  through  Prince  George,  and 
vice‐versa.  The growth in container traffic of container vessels and intermodal trains will have a 
significant effect on  regional air quality.   Air quality  is not currently a major concern  in Prince 
Rupert  given  the  small  size of  the  community  and  the  ability of  the  air  basin  to  absorb  these 
toxins.  Even at a micro scale we do not expect air quality to be a problem due to the reliance on 
rail  transport.    Trains  traveling up  the  Skeena River  valley  fully  loaded will  certainly  introduce 
toxins and contribute to air pollution  in Prince George, where federal air quality standards are 
often  exceeded.    Adding  100  trains  a  day  to  the  rail  traffic  in  Prince  George  will  have  a 
significant, negative impact on the air basin which is already of concern.9 
Much of the economic activity generated by ports is in peripheral activities, not directly through 




is  anticipated  that  most  of  these  businesses  will  actually  locate  in  Prince  George.    It  is  not 
necessary  for  them  to  be  located  in  Prince  Rupert  itself.    Martin  estimates  that  507,448 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Americans  held  jobs  at  the  ports  themselves  as  terminal  operators,  longshoremen,  freight 
forwarders,  steamship  agents,  ship  pilots,  tug  and  towboat  operators,  chandlers, 
warehousemen, as well as  jobs  in  the dredging, marine construction,  ship  repair,  trucking and 
railroad  industries.   This  is  six percent of  the estimated number of  jobs working  for ports and 
port related industries.  The study estimates another 630,913 induced jobs supported by these 
port jobs due to purchases of food, housing, transportation, apparel, medical and entertainment 






Prince  Rupert  plans  to  rely  in  large  part  on  carrying  traffic  for  US  destinations.    Container 
throughput in North America in 2004 was 41.1 million TEU, and 78 percent of Asia‐US traffic was 
handled by the West Coast Ports.  In 2006 and 2007, about five percent of the volume carried by 
the  Port  of  Vancouver  was  US  traffic.11    Approximately  30  percent  of  inbound  containers  at 
Halifax  in  2007 were  bound  for  the US12,  a  significantly  larger  percentage  than  at  Vancouver.  
Costs associated with entry into the US market are the extra cost of border security in the post 
9‐11 era and documentation. Interruptions or slowdowns to clear customs carry a cost as it is a 
loss  of  time  in  transporting  and  delivering  goods.  A  recent  study  examined  this  issue  and 










has  the  potential  to  capture  the  related  exports.    From  2005  to  the  present  North  American 
West  Coast  Ports  have  imported  more  loaded  containers  than  they  have  exported,  creating 
more  demand  for  eastbound  service  from  Asia  than  westbound  service  to  Asia,  and  a much 
higher cost for eastbound service.  In Southern California the export/import ratio is about 0.35, 
in Northern California 0.95,  in Oregon 0.98 and in Washington 0.72.   At the port of Vancouver 
the  ratio was  also  0.72.14    Ports  that  can  offer  export  traffic  allow  shipping  lines  to  generate 
more  revenue  and  are  therefore  appealing  as  destinations.    This  balance  of  trade  also  allows 
efficiencies landside as intermodal trains do not need to return to the port empty, but can carry 
export  loads  which  are  revenue  generating  loads.    This  makes  serving  the  destination  more 
appealing to the railroad as well, as revenue can be generated on trips to and from the port. 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Most shipping  lines choose to visit terminals with significant exports  last  in a multi‐stop route, 
and destinations with “hot” imports first on a multi‐stop route.  Typical multi‐stop routes leave 
Asia  for Southern California, and  then  travel up  the coast  to Northern California or  the Pacific 
Northwest before returning to Asia.  This allows them to service the “hot” imports in Southern 
California  quickly  and  as  much  as  possible  load  the  vessel  with  loaded  containers  before 







The  container  industry  is  worldwide,  with  90  percent  of  global  cargo  (by  weight)  carried  in 













that  importers  can  send  their  marine  containers  to  a  transload  facility,  discharging  40  foot 
containers into trailers or domestic containers for haulage either directly to a store or a regional 
distribution center.16 
However,  under  the  Canadian  post  audit  system,  ocean  carriers  have  the  status  as  a  “pool 
operator.”17  Under  this  status,  which  allows  for  an  inventory  of  equipment,  containers  can 
remain  in  Canada  duty  free  for  up  to  180  days;  as  a  result,  the  time  restrictions  are  not  the 
primary limiting concern of Canadian cabotage, but rather, the type and direction of movement 
allowed. For large ocean carriers such as Maersk, the differences in US and Canadian cabotage 
laws  does  not  affect  the  way  Maersk  does  business  in  Canada.  For  Maersk,  the  time 
requirement is not a concern; rather, greater freedom of movement in addition to ports of exit 
is  preferred.18  For  other  companies,  the  time  restriction  and  DPR  requirement  act  “as  a 
hindrance to developing synergistic partnership.”19 
While  it  may  be  beneficial  for  Canadian  cabotage  regulations  to  be  harmonized  with  more 
liberal  US  cabotage,  it  is  not  clear  Canadian  cabotage  adversely  impacts  large  international 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ocean carriers.    It  seems shipping  lines may have a preference  for managing containers  in  the 
US, over Canada, due to the reduced restrictions. 
North American Port Capacity  
Container  traffic  continues  to  grow worldwide  and  is  expected  to  double  in  the  next  decade. 
Containerization is a dynamic trade for ports, involving significant capital, is highly competitive, 
and is risky by nature. Increasing containerization growth has had an impact on Vancouver and 
other major US west  coast ports. Much of  the container  trade growth comes  from the  rise of 
China  as  a major manufacturer,  and  has  led  to  a  booming  trans‐Pacific  pendulum  trade  from 
Asia  to  the  west  coast  of  North  America.  The  Port  of  Vancouver  experienced  congestion  as 
imports  from  Asia  led  to  double‐digit  growth  in  2004,  leading  the  Port  Authority  to  plan  to 
develop  a  second  container  terminal.  At  the  Port  of  Prince  Rupert,  capacity will  be  added  as 
needed in a more isolated environment to handle the growing trans‐Pacific container trade.20  
Demand  for  services  at North American Ports  has been  growing dramatically  over  the  last  15 
years (see figure 7 below).  The vast majority of this growth, however, has occurred at the ports 
of  Los Angeles/Long Beach,  and New York/New  Jersey.   While other ports on  the West Coast 
have  experienced  strong  growth,  the  growth  at  LA/LB  and  NY/NJ  has  been  exponential.  
Although there has been much discussion about the need for additional capacity, there are still 
ports operating below their capacity.  
It  is  difficult  to  identify  the  capacity  of  a  marine  terminal.    Port  capacity  is  a  function  of  its 
physical infrastructure as well as its methods of operation and information infrastructure.  This 
can be observed by  the distinctly  lower TEU  throughput/hectare  ratios when comparing ports 
around the globe (see figure 8 below).  
The historic ports of Hong Kong and Singapore have experienced constraints on  their physical 
land  area  for  some  time  and  so  have  optimized  their  operations  to minimize  land  utilization, 
while relying more heavily on more available resources such as labor.  The argument, therefore, 
that West  Coast  Ports will  soon  run  out  of  capacity  is  dependent  on  their  being  a maximum 
capacity  for  these  ports  to  move  containers.    It  is  clear  that  with  changes  currently  being 
















Figure  8.  Productivity  metrics  for  selected  world  ports  (source:  National  Urban  Freight 
Conference 2006 21). 
Canadian Political Science Review 2(4) December 2008 






contrast  to developing export markets.   Shipping  lines want  to visit ports with exports  last,  to 
load the vessel prior to returning to Asia.  Basic port services such as terminal operations must 
occur  in  Prince Rupert  but much peripheral  activity  could  occur  in  Prince George,  such  as  re‐
handling and rail switching operations.  This could mean significant economic activity for Prince 
George as well as the associated environmental cost.  It is assumed that much of the two million 
TEUs  handled  at  Prince  Rupert  will  be  destined  to  the  US.    Currently  only  five  percent  of 
Vancouver’s imports are destined to the US.  There are barriers to cross‐border trade that need 
to be understood and addressed if Prince Rupert is to capture more of the US market.  As a sign 
of  things  to  come,  Prince  Rupert  has  had  a  very  successful  first  year,  and  is  delivering  on  its 

































                       
                    A Container Terminal at the Port of Prince Rupert (60‐75)     
   
75 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 Marinova Consulting Ltd, & Partners, The Use of Containers in Canada, Transport Canada, December 
2006. 
17 Railways, truckers, and third parties (freight forwarders, shippers, etc) could qualify if they either lease 
containers or maintain a storage yard for the purpose of using containers in international traffic. 
18 Containers must return along the route where a container entered Canada, the exception being empty 
containers can exit by any port. 
19 Supply Chain Solutions International and University of Manitoba Transport Institute, A Review of 
Regulations Governing Use of International Marine Containers in Canadian Domestic Cargo Carriage, 
December 2005. 
20 M. Ircha, “Characteristics of tomorrow’s successful port.” The AIMS Atlantica Papers #4, January 2006. 
Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
21 H.D. Le‐Griffin and M. Murphy, “Assessing container terminal productivity: Experiences at the ports of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach” presented at the February 2006 National Urban Freight Conference. 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